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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MCKAY, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Sheet 
Metal Workers' International Association Local 19 [Union], 
Defendant Herre Bros., Inc., and a third party, Sheet Metal 
Contractors Association of Central Pennsylvania[SMCA] 
concerning the enforcement of a collective bargaining 
agreement. Herre Bros. attempted to revoke its bargaining 
rights in the SMCA with the intent that it would not be 
bound by a later-negotiated collective bargaining agreement 
between the SMCA and the Union. The Union sued Herre 
Bros., taking the position that Herre Bros. was bound to 
the Union's 1995 agreement with the SMCA. The district 
court granted summary judgment to the Union, ruling that 
Herre Bros. was bound to the 1995 collective bargaining 
agreement, and ordered specific performance of that 
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agreement after a trial on damages. Herre Bros. appeals the 
district court's rulings. 
 
I 
 
Herre Bros. is a mechanical and electrical contractor in 
Enola, Pennsylvania, engaged in the construction of sheet 
metal, piping, plumbing, heating, and air conditioning. 
Beginning in at least 1992, Herre Bros. joined the SMCA, a 
multiemployer bargaining association comprised of sheet 
metal and air conditioning contractors. The parties agree 
that as a result of that membership Herre Bros. was a party 
to the collective bargaining agreement between the Union 
and the SMCA which was effective from June 1, 1992, 
through May 31, 1995. In February 1995, Herre Bros. 
notified the SMCA that it no longer authorized the 
association to bargain on its behalf. Subsequently, the 
SMCA sent, and the Union received, notice that the 
association no longer had the bargaining authorization of 
Herre Bros. This notification was signed by Anthony J. 
Forlizzi, who was both president of the SMCA and vice- 
president of Herre Bros. In the meantime, the 1992 
collective bargaining agreement was nearing expiration and 
the parties set about negotiating a new agreement. 
 
The SMCA and the Union entered into a new agreement 
effective June 1, 1995, to May 31, 1998, but Herre Bros. 
and the Union failed to negotiate any agreement. Near the 
end of the bargaining between Herre Bros. and the Union, 
in August and September 1995, the Union allegedly 
discovered that Herre Bros. was still an active member of 
the SMCA despite its revocation of bargaining rights. The 
Union took the position that Herre Bros. was bound by the 
1995 agreement because of Herre Bros.' continuing 
membership in the SMCA. Herre Bros. then withdrew its 
membership from the SMCA and refused to be bound by 
the 1995 agreement. For its part, the SMCA refused to 
either provide the Union with a copy of its by-laws and 
constitution or convene a Joint Adjustment Board to hear 
a grievance against Herre Bros. In response, counsel for the 
Union indicated that the Union would file unfair labor 
practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board. 
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In December 1995, the Union filed a complaint pursuant 
to 29 U.S.C. S 195 against Herre Bros. claiming that it had 
breached the 1995 collective bargaining agreement with the 
Union by failing to recognize that agreement and adhere to 
its terms.1 Meanwhile, a panel of the National Joint 
Adjustment Board unanimously decided on March 21, 
1996, that Herre Bros. was bound to the existing collective 
bargaining agreement effective from June 1, 1995, through 
May 31, 1998, because Herre Bros. "did not follow the 
procedures required to properly withdraw their bargaining 
rights[ ] and Association membership." 2 App., Vol. II at 
236A. 
 
On cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of 
liability, the district court granted partial summary 
judgment to the Union in an order filed September 16, 
1996. See id. at 256A. The court determined that Herre 
Bros. had not effectively withdrawn from the SMCA and 
therefore was bound to the terms of the new agreement. 
The court, however, deferred entry of judgment until the 
conclusion of the case. It also denied Herre Bros.' motion 
for reconsideration of the summary judgment decision. On 
November 18, 1996, the district court conducted a bench 
trial on the issue of damages. On August 27, 1997, the 
court entered an Order and Memorandum that disposed of 
some of the damages issues in the case and granted 
specific performance of the 1995 agreement but which 
again deferred entry of judgment until the conclusion of the 
case. See id., Vol. I at 12A, 14A. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Union also named the SMCA in the suit, claiming that it breached 
the 1995 agreement by refusing to convene a grievance panel to hear the 
Union's dispute. On July 8, 1996, the Union voluntarily dismissed the 
SMCA from its complaint. 
 
2. In its amended complaint in federal court, the Union argued that 
Herre Bros. was bound by the Adjustment Board's decision that Herre 
Bros. was a party to the contract because Herre Bros. had failed to move 
to vacate the award within the time permitted by statute in 
Pennsylvania. We do not address the Union's argument on appeal that 
Herre Bros. should have filed a motion to vacate the decision of the 
National Adjustment Board before filing suit in federal court because it 
is not necessary to our resolution of the dispute and because the Union 
did not raise it before the district court in this case. 
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II 
 
As a threshold issue, we must determine whether the 
district court's order, or a portion thereof, is appealable or 
whether the appeal should be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. The August 27, 1997 Order from which the 
appeal is taken granted judgment to the Union in the 
amount of $325,203.98; required Herre Bros. to provide the 
Union with an accounting of all hours worked by nonunion 
workers between September 27, 1996, and the date of the 
order; allowed the Union to file a supplemental brief 
requesting damages to union funds resulting from Herre 
Bros.' failure to utilize union workers after September 27, 
1996, and allowed Herre Bros. to file a reply brief thereto; 
directed Herre Bros. to specifically perform the 1995 
contract between the Union and the SMCA until it expired 
in 1998; and directed the clerk of the court "to defer entry 
of judgment until the conclusion of the case." Id. at 12A- 
13A. Herre Bros. filed its notice of appeal from this order on 
September 14, 1997. 
 
In a letter dated September 16, 1997, this court notified 
the parties that the appeal would be submitted for possible 
dismissal due to a jurisdictional defect, namely, that the 
order filed August 27, 1997, did not appear to befinal 
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. S 1291. In response, both 
parties contend that the August 27 Order is appealable 
because the portion of it which directs specific performance 
of the 1995 agreement is an appealable interlocutory order. 
It seems clear and is beyond dispute that the August 27 
Order is not a final judgment in that it does not dispose of 
all of the damages issues in the case and because it defers 
entry of judgment until a later undetermined time. 
Nonetheless, we believe the parties are correct in arguing 
that the specific performance portion of the August 27 
Order is appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1) based on 
the following analysis. 
 
In its Memorandum accompanying the August 27 Order, 
the district court made findings of fact and conclusions of 
law concerning damages. The court found that the Union 
sought various money damages, "a declaratory judgment 
that Herre [Bros.] [was] bound by the 1995 agreement," and 
"specific performance requiring Herre [Bros.] to honor the 
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1995 agreement." Id. at 18A-19A. In analyzing monetary 
damages, the court stated that the Union "[was] entitled to" 
damages for work performed by union members and 
nonunion members after June 1, 1995, id. at 19A, 32A, 
and also to liquidated damages. See id. at 31A, 33A. In its 
discussion of declaratory relief, the court explained that 
because it had previously determined that Herre Bros. was 
bound by the 1995 agreement "the clerk of [the] court 
[would] enter judgment in favor of [the Union] on the issue 
of liability" at the conclusion of the case. Id. at 31A. The 
court then discussed the Union's demand of specific 
performance which would require Herre Bros. "to hire all of 
its workers from the union hiring hall." Id. at 32A. The 
district court granted this relief, concluding that Herre 
Bros. "[would] be directed to specifically perform the 1995 
contract for the remainder of its term." Id. at 33A. In 
contrast to the court's language in the Memorandum 
determining that the Union was entitled to certain damages 
and a declaratory judgment, the court clearly stated that it 
was directing Herre Bros. to specifically perform the 1995 
agreement until its expiration in May 1998. See id. at 32A- 
33A. Further, while the declaratory relief portion of the 
Memorandum clearly deferred entry of judgment until the 
conclusion of the case, see id. at 31A, the paragraph 
granting specific performance contained no such limitation. 
See id. at 32A. These differences in the court's use of 
language leads us to conclude that the court intended the 
order of specific performance to be an injunctive order that 
was effective immediately. In addition, we believe that the 
specific enforcement of the 1995 agreement falls under the 
definition of an injunctive order because it was"directed to 
a party, enforceable by contempt, and designed to accord or 
protect some or all of the substantive relief sought" by that 
party. Cohen v. Board of Trustees, 867 F.2d 1455, 1465 n.9 
(3d Cir. 1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see 
also Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 154 
(3d Cir. 1999) (characterizing the denial of specific 
performance as a preliminary injunction). 
 
Our treatment of the specific performance portion of the 
August 27 Order as an appealable injunctive order also is 
supported by a subsequent order filed by the district court. 
In this later order, filed September 19, 1997, the district 
 
                                6 
  
court stayed pending appeal the portion of the August 27 
Order that directed specific performance.3 See Attach. to 
Appellant's Br. (September 19, 1997 Order at 2). The 
court's decision to grant a stay pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
62(c) reveals that it had intended the injunctive order 
compelling specific performance to be enforceable 
immediately upon filing the August 27 Order. See Cohen, 
867 F.2d at 1466. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the August 27, 1997 
Order is an appealable interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(a)(1), see id. at 1468 (holding that an order of 
specific performance of a contract has been regarded as a 
classic form of equitable relief and falls within S 1292(a)(1)), 
and we have jurisdiction over the specific performance 
portion of that Order. 
 
To review this appeal, i.e., to determine whether specific 
performance is merited, we need to review the question of 
liability. Clearly, the court's grant of injunctive relief was 
predicated on its prior summary judgment determination 
that Herre Bros. was bound to the 1995 contract. See id. As 
a result, and to avoid having to reexamine this issue after 
entry of final judgment, we conclude that our jurisdiction 
over the specific performance question necessarily requires 
us to address whether the district court correctly granted 
summary judgment to the Union by determining that Herre 
Bros. was bound to the 1995 agreement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The court also stayed the portion of the August 27 Order directing an 
accounting and supplemental briefing on damages, and it purported to 
amend the September 16, 1996 summary judgment order and the 
August 27 Order by directing that judgment would be entered on 
September 19, 1997. We note that the September 19, 1997 Order is 
neither a final judgment nor appealable for reasons discussed in our 
decision in the appeals and cross-appeals related to this case. See Sheet 
Metal Workers' Internat'l Ass'n Local 19 v. Herre Bros., Inc., Nos. 97- 
7552, 7553, 7554, 7555 (3d Cir., December 30, 1999). 
 
On September 23, 1997, the court filed an order to correct clerical 
errors contained in the judgment that was filed pursuant to the 
September 19, 1997 Order. The substance of the September 19 and 
September 23 Orders is identical. 
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III 
 
Our resolution of this appeal turns first on whether Herre 
Bros. is bound to the 1995 collective bargaining agreement 
executed by the Union and the SMCA. If Herre Bros. is so 
obligated, we also must determine whether the court 
properly ordered specific performance of the 1995 
agreement. We therefore first examine whether the district 
court erred in granting partial summary judgment to the 
Union by determining that Herre Bros. was bound to the 
1995 collective bargaining agreement. 
 
We review the court's partial grant of summary judgment 
de novo, applying the same standards used by the district 
court. See Salley v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 
980 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322-23 (1986)). We must determine whether the 
record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non- 
moving party, namely, Herre Bros., shows that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c); Salley, 160 F.3d at 980; Antol v. Perry, 82 
F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
A 
 
At the heart of this dispute is the distinction between two 
types of multiemployer bargaining relationships. 4 Under 
S 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
S 159(a), a union may become the exclusive bargaining 
representative of an appropriate unit of employees if a 
majority of employees designate the union as the 
representative. It is well established that an employer with 
a S 9(a) relationship to a union has an obligation to 
negotiate a successor contract with the union in good faith 
and that the union enjoys a presumption of majority status. 
See James Luterbach Constr. Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 976, 979 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Union claims that Herre Bros. waived this issue because it did not 
raise it before the district court at the appropriate time. Because the 
district court addressed the distinction between multiemployer 
bargaining associations in its summary judgment order, the issue is 
properly before this court on appeal. 
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(1994). Accordingly, neither an employer nor a union 
governed by S 9(a) may unilaterally withdraw from the 
multiemployer bargaining unit or the collective bargaining 
agreement; instead, withdrawal is subject to specific 
requirements. See Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 
393-95 (1958). 
 
Unlike a S 9(a) relationship, an employer member of a 
multiemployer bargaining unit who has a relationship with 
a union under S 8(f) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.S 158(f), does 
not have an obligation to bargain for a successor contract. 
See Luterbach, 315 N.L.R.B. at 979; Patterson-Stevens, Inc., 
316 N.L.R.B. 1278, 1285 (1995). Section 8(f) differs because 
it allows employers engaged primarily in the building and 
construction industry to enter into pre-hire agreements 
which contain union security clauses whether or not the 
union represents a majority of the employer's employees. 
See 29 U.S.C. S 158(f). Because the union enjoys no 
presumption of majority status, either party in aS 8(f) 
relationship is free to unilaterally withdraw and"avoid any 
obligation to bargain for a successor contract" upon the 
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 5 
Luterbach, 315 N.L.R.B. at 978; see also John Deklewa & 
Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1385 & n.42 (1987) (holding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Historically, a S 8(f) agreement could be repudiated by either party at 
any time for any reason. See John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 
1375, 1378 (1987), enf 'd sub nom. International Ass'n of Bridge, 
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 
1988). Under pre-Deklewa case law, a S 8(f) relationship converted into 
a S 9(a) relationship merely upon a showing that the signatory union 
enjoyed majority support during a relevant period among an appropriate 
unit of the signatory employer's employees. See id. "[U]pon conversion, 
an employer [was] `under the statutory duty to recognize and bargain 
with the union as the employees' exclusive representative.' " Id. at 1379. 
Finding several flaws in the conversion doctrine, including its failure to 
foster industry stability or advance the objective of employee free 
choice, 
the Board in Deklewa rejected the doctrine, see id. at 1380-84, and held 
that parties to an 8(f) agreement are required to comply with that 
agreement until it expires unless employees vote to reject or change the 
bargaining representative. See id. at 1385. Accordingly, neither 
employers nor unions are free to unilaterally repudiate such an 
agreement for the life of the agreement but may only do so upon its 
expiration. See id. at 1385-86. 
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that S 8(f) agreements are enforceable during the life of the 
agreement but impose no continuing obligation to bargain 
following the termination of that agreement), enforced sub 
nom. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental 
Iron Workers v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Luterbach instructs that an 8(f) employer will be bound by 
multiemployer bargaining only if it is "part of the 
multiemployer unit prior to the dispute" and"has, by a 
distinct affirmative action, recommitted to the union that it 
will be bound by the upcoming or current multiemployer 
negotiations." Luterbach, 315 N.L.R.B. at 980. Thus, "mere 
inaction during the multiemployer negotiations will not 
bind an 8(f) employer to a successor contract." Id. at 979. 
 
Because the distinction between 8(f) and 9(a) significantly 
affects the analysis concerning withdrawal from a 
multiemployer bargaining unit, we examine whetherS 8(f) 
or S 9(a) governs the relationship between the parties in this 
case. The district court held that the S 8(f) rule requiring an 
employer's affirmative action to bind it to the multiemployer 
negotiations does not apply because "Defendant[did] not 
assert nor [did] the record demonstrate that SMCA [was] 
comprised exclusively of S 8(f) employers." App., Vol. II at 
262A. 
 
On appeal, Herre Bros. claims that the record clearly 
establishes that the relationship between the parties is 
governed by S 8(f) because the "SMCA is comprised of 
employers `engaged primarily in the building and 
construction industry' " as indicated by 29 U.S.C. S 158(f). 
Appellant's Br. at 19. Herre Bros. also argues that the court 
improperly applied the summary judgment standard and 
viewed evidence and inferences in favor of the Union. The 
Union responds by asserting that the 1992 agreement itself 
provides clear proof that the employer, through the SMCA, 
"expressly recognized [the Union] as the recognized 
collective bargaining representative under Section 9(a)," 
even when viewed in a light most favorable to Herre Bros. 
Appellee's Br. at 25-26. 
 
To determine whether the relationship here is governed 
by 8(f) or 9(a), we look to federal labor relations law. See 
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. International Union, UAW, 856 F.2d 
579, 591 (3d Cir. 1988). In Deklewa, the Board explained 
 
                                10 
  
that "the party asserting the existence of a 9(a) relationship 
[has the burden] to prove it" because the relationship is 
presumed to be an 8(f) relationship. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. 
at 1385 n.41; see also NLRB v. Goodless Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 
322, 328 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Unless and until a relationship is 
proved to be otherwise, a bargaining relationship between a 
construction industry employer and a union is presumed to 
be 8(f) rather than 9(a)."); Casale Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 
951, 952 (1993) ("[T]he Board presumes that parties in the 
construction industry intend their relationship to be an 8(f) 
relationship."). Deklewa indicated that a party asserting a 
9(a) relationship could overcome the 8(f) presumption by 
showing that a construction industry employer voluntarily 
recognized a union based on a clear showing of majority 
support among the unit employees. See Deklewa , 282 
N.L.R.B. at 1387 n.53. Subsequent Board cases have 
explained that a union can establish a 9(a) relationship 
from an 8(f) relationship in two ways: "(1) through a Board- 
certified election, or (2) through an employer's voluntary 
grant of recognition of the union as the employees' 
exclusive majority bargaining agent." Goodless Elec., 124 
F.3d at 328; see J & R Tile, Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1036 
& n.11 (1988) (citing cases). 
 
To satisfy the voluntary recognition option under 
Goodless Electric, the party asserting the 9(a) relationship 
must show (1) a clear and unequivocal demand to be 
recognized as a 9(a) representative, (2) a voluntary and 
unequivocal grant of such recognition, and (3) a 
contemporaneous showing of majority support among the 
appropriate unit of employees. See Golden West Elec., 307 
N.L.R.B. 1494, 1495 (1992). "[T]here must be evidence that 
the union unequivocally demanded recognition as the 
employees' 9(a) representative and that the employer 
unequivocally accepted it as such." J & R Tile, 291 N.L.R.B. 
at 1036. 
 
With respect to the third requirement, Board precedent 
indicates that the contemporaneous showing of majority 
support may be satisfied in various ways. For example, the 
Board has indicated that majority support may be 
demonstrated through the presentation of employee 
authorization cards to an employer, see Hayman Elec., Inc., 
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314 N.L.R.B. 879, 886 (1994), or through an employer- 
conducted poll prior to initial recognition, see Precision 
Stripping, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1112 (1987). In addition, 
the Board has found the third requirement satisfied where 
an employer's admission or acknowledgment that the union 
enjoyed majority support was given contemporaneously 
with the demand for 9(a) recognition and was provided 
without inquiry into the union's actual status. See Golden 
West Elec., 307 N.L.R.B. at 1495 ("The voluntary 
recognition agreement signed by the Employer by its terms 
unequivocally states that the Union claimed it represented 
a majority of the employees and Employer acknowledged 
that this was so."). In addition, the Board has determined 
that, by signing a collective bargaining agreement 
containing contractual language which unequivocally 
demands and grants 9(a) recognition and states that"the 
Employer is satisfied that the Union represents a majority 
of its eligible employees," the employer confers 9(a) status 
on the union without more. Decorative Floors, Inc., 315 
N.L.R.B. 188, 188 (1994); see also Triple C Maintenance, 
Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 1998 WL 799280, at *6-*7 
(N.L.R.B. Oct. 30, 1998) (holding that recognition clause of 
collective bargaining agreement established that union was 
exclusive representative of employer's employees based on 
S 9(a)); MFP Fire Protection, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 840, 841-42 
(1995) (determining that employer's execution of a 
document acknowledging 9(a) representative status of the 
union was sufficient to establish 9(a) relationship, despite 
absence of other independent proof showing majority 
status), enforced on other grounds, 101 F.3d 1341, 1343 
(10th Cir. 1996). 
 
Similarly, the Board has deemed as sufficient proof a 
union's claim of majority support that went unchallenged 
by the employer for more than six months. See Triple A Fire 
Protection, Inc. 312 N.L.R.B. 1088, 1089 (1993) (applying 
six-month limitation period to preclude employer from 
challenging union's majority status approximately four 
years after employer signed contract recognizing 9(a) 
relationship), enforced, 136 F.3d 727, 736-37 (11th Cir. 
1998); Casale Indus., 311 N.L.R.B. at 953 (refusing to 
consider employer's challenge to union's majority status six 
years after employer extended 9(a) recognition and limiting 
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challenges to union's majority status to six months after 
employer extends 9(a) status). But see American Automatic 
Sprinkler Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 209, 218 n.6, 222 
(4th Cir. 1998) (holding that six-month limitation period 
does not apply and requiring explicit proof of actual 
majority status contemporaneous with union's demand and 
employer's voluntary recognition). 
 
Applying these principles to this case, we presume that 
the collective bargaining relationship between Herre Bros., 
the SMCA, and the Union was established under S 8(f). 
However, we must review the record to determine whether 
the Union overcame this presumption and whether there 
are genuine issues of fact on this point. 
 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Herre 
Bros., we conclude that the 1992 collective bargaining 
agreement constitutes uncontroverted proof that the parties 
were governed by S 9(a). Article II, S 12 of this agreement is 
a recognition clause. It states: 
 
        Insomuch as[ ] the Union has submitted proof and 
       the Employer is satisfied that the Union represents a 
       majority of its employees in the bargaining unit 
       described herein, the Employer recognizes the Union as 
       the exclusive Collective Bargaining Unit on all present 
       and future job sites within the jurisdiction of the 
       Union, unless and until such time as the Union loses 
       its status as the employees exclusive representative as 
       a result of an N.L.R.B. election requested by the 
       employees. The Employer agrees that it will not request 
       an N.L.R.B. election and expressly waives any right it 
       may have to do so. 
 
App., Vol. I at 136A. This language conclusively establishes 
a 9(a) relationship for several reasons. First, while the 
employer does not explicitly demand 9(a) recognition, the 
intent and the content of the language unequivocally imply 
such a demand.6 Second, the contract unequivocally states 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We note that the 1995 collective bargaining agreement contains a 
substantially identical recognition clause as the 1992 agreement. The 
later agreement differs in that it explicitly states that "the Union has 
demanded recognition from the Employer as the exclusive bargaining 
representative . . . under Section 9(a) . . . and has submitted proof 
thereof in the form of signed and dated authorization cards." App., Vol. 
II at 162A. 
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that the employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive 
majority representative of the employees in the bargaining 
unit until the Union loses that status by an employee- 
requested election. Third, although the type of proof is not 
described, the contract clearly recites that the Union 
submitted proof and that the employer is satisfied that the 
union represents a majority of its employees based on that 
proof. By entering into and signing an agreement 
containing the above language, the employer confers 9(a) 
status on the Union. See MFP Fire Protection, 318 N.L.R.B. 
at 841-42; Decorative Floors, 315 N.L.R.B. at 188-89. 
Fourth, the contract contemplates continuance of the 
relationship subject to defeasance by an election 
challenging the union's majority status. This arrangement 
comports with the rule under S 9(a) that the union enjoys 
a presumption of majority status until an employee- 
requested election challenges that status; this structure is 
contemplated by S 9(a) to preserve the freedom of employee 
choice. Cf. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1379-80. We see no 
reason why proof of a 9(a) relationship necessarily requires 
reference to S 9(a) itself in the agreement if the language 
otherwise conclusively gives notice that a 9(a) relationship 
is intended. Moreover, the language of the 1992 contract in 
this case appears indistinguishable from the contract 
language held to be sufficient in Decorative Floors, 315 
N.L.R.B. at 188-89, and Golden West Elec., 307 N.L.R.B. at 
1495. 
 
It is undisputed that Herre Bros. was a member of the 
SMCA at the time this contract language was in effect and 
that it was bound to the 1992 agreement. Thus, even 
construing the contractual language and inferences 
therefrom in a light most favorable to Herre Bros., there is 
simply no way to read an 8(f) relationship into this 
contract. Herre Bros. presents no facts which either create 
a genuine issue of fact on this point or allow us to draw 
any inferences against the inescapable conclusion that a 
9(a) relationship governed the parties in this case. 
 
B 
 
We now turn to the question of withdrawal. The district 
court analyzed whether the employer Herre Bros. had 
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properly withdrawn from the multiemployer bargaining 
association under S 9(a) standards. The court determined 
that Herre Bros. timely notified the SMCA and the Union of 
its revocation of the assignment of its bargaining rights but 
that the revocation was invalidated because Herre Bros.' 
subsequent conduct was inconsistent with the revocation. 
See App., Vol. II at 264A-65A. 
 
On February 13, 1995, the president of Herre Bros., 
Richard A. McBride, wrote a letter to the SMCA revoking 
the association's authority to bargain on behalf of Herre 
Bros. See id. at 254A. As a result, the SMCA sent a letter 
to the president of the Union, Thomas J. Kelly, explaining 
that Herre Bros. "[would] not be assigning the Bargaining 
Authorization to SMCA." Id. at 255A. This letter, dated 
March 1, 1995, was signed by the president of the SMCA, 
Mr. Forlizzi. The record shows that at all times relevant to 
this case, Mr. Forlizzi also was vice-president of sheet metal 
operations at Herre Bros. See id., Vol. I at 53A. On March 
9, 1995, Mr. Kelly sent a letter on behalf of the Union to 
Herre Bros. in which he admitted receiving notice from the 
SMCA that Herre Bros. had not given their bargaining 
rights to the association and he invited Herre Bros. to 
negotiate separately a new collective bargaining agreement 
to replace the one expiring on May 31, 1995. See id., Vol. 
II at 154A. 
 
Meanwhile, the SMCA proceeded to negotiate with the 
Union, meeting six times between May 15, 1995, and July 
18, 1995. Lori A. Eshenaur, executive director of the SMCA, 
and Mr. Kelly were the principal negotiators. They reached 
a tentative agreement on June 2, 1995, and although the 
new agreement was not signed by the parties until July 18, 
1995, it was effective retroactively from June 1, 1995, to 
May 31, 1998. Both the expiring 1992 agreement and the 
new 1995 agreement contained identical language providing 
that all members of the association "shall be bound by this 
Agreement."7 Id., Vol. I at 136A; Vol. II at 162A. If Herre 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Article II, S 13 of the 1992 and the 1995 agreements states in full: 
 
        The Employer hereby agrees that all of its members, both 
       collectively and individually, shall be bound by this Agreement, 
just 
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Bros. failed to effectively withdraw or if its conduct 
subsequently invalidated a withdrawal, it certainly would 
be bound to the 1995 agreement by this provision. 
 
Although Herre Bros. and the Union negotiated 
independently, meeting approximately four times beginning 
on May 23, 1995, they did not reach an agreement. 8 
Toward the end of the negotiation period, on August 30, 
1995, Mr. Kelly sent a letter to Ms. Eshenaur indicating 
that he knew Herre Bros. was still a member of the SMCA 
and Mr. Forlizzi was still president of the SMCA. The 
purpose of the letter was to inquire about what actions the 
SMCA was taking with respect to Herre Bros. and to remind 
the SMCA that S 13 of the 1995 collective bargaining 
agreement bound all members of the SMCA to the terms of 
that agreement. On September 14, 1995, the Union's 
lawyer sent a letter to counsel for Herre Bros. "requesting 
that Herre Brothers acknowledge that it is bound to the 
[1995 collective bargaining agreement] in accordance 
with the terms of that Agreement[,] . . . their membership in 
the [SMCA, and] . . . Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor 
Relations Act." Id., Vol. II at 230A. The next day Mr. Kelly 
sent a letter to Herre Bros. stating that the Union expected 
Herre Bros. to employ all the sheet metal workers beginning 
September 18, 1995, pursuant to the collective bargaining 
agreement to which it believed Herre Bros. was bound. The 
letter was received by Herre Bros. on September 18, 1995. 
However, on September 19, 1995, Mr. Forlizzi, in his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       as surely as if each and every member signed it and whether or not 
       each does so individually and whether or not membership is 
       retained in the Employer Association party to this Agreement. The 
       Employer, as an Association, through its duly elected officers and 
       representatives hereby declares and affirms that each and every 
       member has so agreed and has authorized the officers and 
       representatives named below to sign this agreement, both for the 
       Association and for each member individually. 
 
App., Vol. I at 136A; Vol. II at 162A. 
 
8. The record indicates that Union workers struck Herre Bros. from 
August 16, 1995, through September 17, 1995. Because Herre Bros. fails 
to show the relevance of this strike on the dispute, it has no bearing on 
our analysis. 
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capacity as vice-president at Herre Bros., wrote the SMCA 
notifying it of Herre Bros.' immediate withdrawal from the 
association. See id. at 249A. At this juncture, Herre Bros. 
refused to be bound by the 1995 agreement. 
 
Generally, "[a]n employer who is a member of a 
multiemployer bargaining association is bound by an 
agreement negotiated by the association." NLRB v. 
Hartman, 774 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing 
Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 
404, 412 (1982)). After a multiemployer bargaining 
arrangement is formed binding its members to a union 
agreement, the parties' withdrawal is subject to reasonable 
controls. See Retail Assocs., 120 N.L.R.B. at 393. Absent 
unusual circumstances or mutual consent, neither 
employers nor unions may withdraw from multiemployer 
bargaining arrangements once negotiations for a new 
contract have commenced. See id. at 395."Prohibiting such 
withdrawals contributes to the stability of multiemployer 
units and prevents the use of the scope of the bargaining 
unit as a bargaining lever to secure an economic advantage 
for one side over the other." NLRB v. Marine Mach. Works, 
Inc., 635 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir. 1981); see also NLRB v. 
Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1966) 
("Withdrawal should be restricted to the period before 
negotiations to assure that it is not used as a bargaining 
lever."). 
 
Effective withdrawal from a multiemployer unit must 
meet three requirements. In Retail Associates, the Board 
explained that a S 9(a) employer may abandon the 
multiemployer bargaining unit only if it (1) unequivocally 
withdraws from the association (2) in a timely fashion 
before negotiations for a new contract begin (3) by 
communicating the intent to withdraw to all parties. See 
Retail Assocs., 120 N.L.R.B. at 393, 395. "The decision to 
withdraw must contemplate a sincere abandonment, with 
relative permanency, of the multiemployer unit and the 
embracement of a different course of bargaining on an 
individual-employer basis." Id. at 394. Stated differently, an 
employer may not attempt to "secure the best of two 
worlds" by purportedly withdrawing bargaining authority 
but then remaining a member of a multiemployer unit in 
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the hope of securing advantageous terms through group 
negotiations. Associated Shower Door Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 
677, 682 (1973), enforced, 512 F.2d 230, 233 (9th Cir. 
1975); accord Michael J. Bollinger Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 406, 
407-08 (1980), enforced, 705 F.2d 444 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(Table); cf. Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 
669/Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, 318 N.L.R.B. 347, 
348 (1995) (distinguishing employer's timely and adequate 
withdrawal from bargaining association from case where 
employer "hangs back" to see how bargaining will proceed), 
enforced, 853 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1988) (Table)."Clearly, all 
parties to collective bargaining need to know with whom 
they are bargaining and who will be bound by any 
agreement that is reached." Hartman, 774 F.2d at 1383. 
 
By the exchange of letters in February and March of 
1995 between Herre Bros., the SMCA, and the Union, Herre 
Bros. met the requirements of withdrawal set forth by Retail 
Associates, 120 N.L.R.B. at 393, 395. Herre Bros. 
unequivocally notified the association that it was 
withdrawing its bargaining rights before negotiations for the 
new 1995 contract began; that intent was communicated to 
the Union by Mr. Forlizzi on behalf of the SMCA; and the 
Union acknowledged the revocation of bargaining rights to 
Herre Bros. We now examine whether Herre Bros.' actions 
after its revocation invalidated the revocation. 
 
"The Board has often held that an employer's withdrawal 
from multiemployer bargaining is nullified when its 
subsequent actions are inconsistent with its stated intent 
to abandon group bargaining . . . ." See International 
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 286 N.L.R.B. 226, 230 
(1987). Certain conduct, therefore, is prohibited to prevent 
the employer from obtaining the "best of two worlds." 
Associated Shower Door, 205 N.L.R.B. at 682; accord 
Trustees of the Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. 
Universal Constr. Servs., 695 F. Supp. 554, 564 (S.D. Fla. 
1988) ("Defendant may not attempt to seek the`best of two 
worlds' by attempting to assert that his obligations have 
terminated while continuing to reap the benefits of hiring 
and employing Union members, and continuing to conduct 
itself as though it were bound under the agreement."). 
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The Board's jurisprudence in this area is governed largely 
by the factual particularities of each case. Nonetheless, two 
principles have emerged. First, the Board has decided that 
an employer's continued membership in a multiemployer 
association after revoking bargaining rights is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the intent to revoke 
bargaining rights. See Ladies' Garment Workers' , 286 
N.L.R.B. at 230 ("[T]he fact that an employer does not 
resign from the multiemployer association is not 
inconsistent with withdrawal . . . from multiemployer 
bargaining."); Walt's Broiler, 270 N.L.R.B. 556, 557-58 
(1984) (holding that employers' continued membership in 
multiemployer association "[did] not negate the clear and 
unequivocal intent" not to be bound to a multiemployer 
agreement); cf. Patterson-Stevens, 316 N.L.R.B. at 1286 
(finding that S 8(f) employer did not act in manner 
inconsistent with withdrawal from multiemployer 
bargaining despite fact that it did not terminate 
membership in association and it continued to serve on 
association's board of directors). Thus, while Herre Bros. 
did not withdraw completely from the SMCA until 
September 19, 1995, well after the bargaining had begun 
and concluded, its continued membership in the 
association after revocation did not necessarily contradict 
its intent to revoke bargaining rights. 
 
Second, the Board and the courts have stated that an 
employer may be bound to a multiemployer agreement, 
even after effecting a timely withdrawal from an association, 
by continuing to participate actively in the association's 
negotiations and continuing to observe membership 
obligations such as paying dues to the association. See, 
e.g., Dependable Tile Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 1147, 1147 (1984) 
(holding that employer nullified its withdrawal from 
multiemployer bargaining by renewing its membership in 
the association and participating actively in group 
negotiations for a new contract), enforced Hartman, 774 
F.2d at 1384-85; Bollinger, 252 N.L.R.B. at 407 
(determining that employer's pattern of sending withdrawal 
letters to the union while attending and participating in 
multiemployer bargaining did not constitute effective 
withdrawal); Associated Shower Door, 205 N.L.R.B. at 682 
(finding withdrawal ineffective in part because employers' 
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subsequent participation in multiemployer negotiations 
retracted or nullified any withdrawal).9  Even where the 
Board found that withdrawal was effective and was not 
invalidated, it suggested that an employer may nullify its 
withdrawal "by attempting to secure favorable terms in [a] 
new multiemployer . . . agreement, while reserving[the] 
right to reject any agreement [it] did not like." See Ladies' 
Garment Workers', 286 N.L.R.B. at 231. Accordingly, even 
though continued membership in a multiemployer 
bargaining association is not necessarily inconsistent with 
revocation, it can be made inconsistent by too active 
participation in the association or in the association's 
negotiations with a union. 
 
The record here shows that Mr. Forlizzi remained 
president of the SMCA after timely withdrawing Herre Bros.' 
bargaining rights from the association, during the 
negotiations between the SMCA and the Union for the 1995 
contract, and until Herre Bros. completely withdrew from 
the association on September 19, 1995.10  The record also 
reveals that Mr. Forlizzi was present at and participated in 
the individual negotiations with the Union on behalf of 
Herre Bros. We examine Mr. Forlizzi's actions in these 
capacities between March 9, 1995, the date on which the 
Union admitted receiving notice of Herre Bros.' revocation 
of its bargaining rights from the SMCA, and September 19, 
1995, the date on which Herre Bros. withdrew its 
membership from the association, to determine their impact 
on the question of withdrawal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Generally, when withdrawal or revocation is "ineffective," this means 
that the employer failed to satisfy the Retail Associates requirements of 
unequivocal withdrawal by timely communicating the intent to withdraw 
to all parties before negotiations for a new contract begin. See Retail 
Assocs., 120 N.L.R.B. at 393, 395. When withdrawal or revocation is 
"nullified," the employer has acted in a manner inconsistent with the 
intent to withdraw. While some courts confuse this distinction, it is 
really a false distinction because the end result is the same: The 
employer is bound to the collective bargaining agreement. 
 
10. By a check dated July 28, 1995, after the new 1995 contract had 
been signed by the SMCA and the Union, Herre Bros. paid its dues to 
the SMCA, thereby renewing its membership in the association. 
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On April 11, 1995, Mr. Forlizzi attended a meeting of the 
Board of Directors of the SMCA. In his deposition, Mr. 
Forlizzi admitted that he discussed the fact of upcoming 
Union renegotiations at the meeting but stated that he did 
not discuss the terms or conditions of the contract. On 
three subsequent occasions, however, May 15, May 23, and 
June 15, 1995, Mr. Forlizzi received information by fax 
from Ms. Eshenaur concerning the negotiations between 
the Union and the SMCA which included contract 
particulars.11 See App., Vol. I at 69A-76A, 101A; Vol. II at 
200A, 217A. Mr. Forlizzi admitted in his deposition that he 
requested this information for the purpose of sharing 
information and that, "as a matter of policy, the head of the 
negotiating committee[, not the president of the SMCA,] 
would have been the one to receive all this 
correspondence." Id., Vol. I at 73A-74A. Specifically, the 
items Mr. Forlizzi requested to be faxed to him included 
SMCA-Union contract proposals, see id., Vol. II at 200A- 
08A, synopses of negotiations between the Union and the 
SMCA, see id., Vol. I at 74A-75A, and final contract 
changes and wage rates, see id., 75A-76A; Vol. II at 217A- 
23A. In addition to receiving negotiating information by fax, 
Mr. Forlizzi admitted to three to six phone conversations 
with Ms. Eshenaur and one phone conversation with 
William Sponaugle, Chairman of the SMCA negotiating 
committee, in which they discussed the terms of the 
agreement between the Union and the SMCA, see id., Vol. 
I at 101A-02A, 104A, 106A, and "what [the Union] was 
asking for and what SMCA was offering." Id.  at 69A. Ms. 
Eshenaur testified that Mr. Forlizzi asked for the 
information on the negotiations and that she sent it 
because both the SMCA and Herre Bros. were in 
negotiations with the Union. See id. at 104A. Finally, Ms. 
Eshenaur also stated that Mr. Forlizzi attended a meeting 
with her and counsel for the SMCA concerning one of the 
contract clauses in negotiation. See id. at 107A-08A. 
 
Without drawing any inferences, we think this evidence 
speaks for itself. The evidence shows that after Herre Bros. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The record also shows that, on May 22, 1995, Mr. Forlizzi sent a fax 
concerning the SMCA-Union negotiations to Tom Davies, counsel for 
Herre Bros. 
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revoked its bargaining rights Mr. Forlizzi sought out 
information from the SMCA-Union negotiations and 
discussed the details of that bargaining with at least two 
SMCA people directly involved in the negotiations. Although 
Mr. Forlizzi did not actually attend or participate in 
bargaining sessions between the SMCA and the Union, it is 
clear from the record that he did participate in the 
negotiations through his discussions with Ms. Eshenaur 
and Mr. Sponaugle. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Forlizzi 
sought information concerning the terms of the SMCA- 
Union negotiations at the same time that he also was 
negotiating with the Union on behalf of Herre Bros. 
demonstrates that he intended to use that information 
either for his own bargaining purposes on behalf of Herre 
Bros. or to improve the bargain for the SMCA in his role as 
its president. From this evidence, together with 
Ms. Eshenaur's testimony confirming Mr. Forlizzi's 
statements, we conclude that Mr. Forlizzi's conduct was 
inconsistent with Herre Bros.' revocation of bargaining 
rights. Moreover, the record does not create any genuine 
issues of fact regarding this point. Even drawing all 
inferences in favor of Herre Bros., there is no way around 
the fact that Mr. Forlizzi obtained information from the 
SMCA-Union negotiations to which he was privy and took 
advantage of the benefits of multiemployer bargaining to 
secure the best terms either for Herre Bros. or for the 
SMCA. Either way, he was engaging in the very sort of 
conduct that Associated Shower Door, 205 N.L.R.B. at 682, 
counseled against.12 See Bollinger, 252 N.L.R.B. at 407-08. 
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in 
finding that Mr. Forlizzi's conduct subsequent to the notice 
of revocation nullified the revocation because it was 
inconsistent with Herre Bros.' stated intent to abandon 
group bargaining and negotiate independently. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Mr. Forlizzi's ex-officio membership in the SMCA Negotiating 
Committee, see App., Vol. I at 43A, does not show conduct inconsistent 
or consistent with Herre Bros.' stated intent to abandon multiemployer 
bargaining. It is only Mr. Forlizzi's actual conduct in relation to the 
SMCA and the Union that invalidates Herre Bros.' revocation of 
bargaining rights. 
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Although we have determined that the district court did 
not err in finding that Herre Bros. nullified its revocation of 
bargaining rights, we briefly examine whether the Union 
acquiesced to Herre Bros.' nullification of its revocation. If 
the Union acquiesced, the revocation remains operative. 
See, e.g., Associated Shower Door, 205 N.L.R.B. at 681. 
 
Usually, courts examine whether a union has acquiesced 
or consented to an employer's withdrawal in situations 
where the withdrawal was apparently ineffective because it 
was untimely. See, e.g., Reliable Roofing Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 
716, 717 (1979) (concluding that union did not clearly 
intend to acquiesce to employer's withdrawal from ongoing 
multiemployer bargaining); Associated Shower Door, 205 
N.L.R.B. at 681 (questioning whether union acquiesced to 
employer's attempted withdrawal after negotiations had 
commenced). In this case, Herre Bros. seems to argue that 
their revocation of bargaining rights trumps any conduct 
that may have nullified the revocation because the Union 
acquiesced to that conduct. 
 
A union may acquiesce to an employer's withdrawal in 
several manners, including initiating individual bargaining 
with the employer, listening to the employer's counteroffers, 
and offering terms or conditions to the employer that are 
more favorable than those proposed to the multiemployer 
association. See Associated Shower Door, 205 N.L.R.B. at 
681. In this case, the Union initiated separate bargaining 
with the employer, but both parties agree that it did not 
offer more favorable terms or conditions to the employer. 
See App., Vol. II at 226A; Appellant's Br. at 25. These facts 
alone do not answer whether the Union acquiesced. 
 
Another consideration relevant to the question of 
acquiescence is when the Union learned that Herre Bros. 
was a member of the SMCA and that Mr. Forlizzi was still 
its president. The SMCA executive director, Ms. Eshenaur, 
testified that Herre Bros.' continuing membership in the 
association and Mr. Forlizzi's presidency were discussed at 
several negotiating sessions with the Union between May 
and July 1995. See App., Vol. I at 110A-11A, 114A. Union 
president and negotiator Mr. Kelly stated that he did not 
know prior to the negotiations that Herre Bros. remained a 
member of the SMCA or that Mr. Forlizzi was still president 
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of the association, see id., Vol. II at 224A, and that no 
SMCA representative informed the Union of these facts 
until the end of August 1995. See id. at 225A-26A. The 
notice sent by the SMCA to the Union indicating that Herre 
Bros. no longer assigned bargaining rights to the 
association did not mention Herre Bros.' continued 
membership in the association, nor did it say anything 
about Mr. Forlizzi continuing as president of the SMCA. See 
id. at 255A. These differing testimonies reflect that 
questions of fact exists about when the Union knew that 
Herre Bros. remained a member of the SMCA and that Mr. 
Forlizzi was still the president of the association, but we 
conclude that they are immaterial fact questions based on 
the following reasoning. It is undisputed that at the time of 
the negotiations in 1995 between the Union and the SMCA 
and between the Union and Herre Bros. the Union was 
unaware of Mr. Forlizzi's attempts to obtain information 
regarding the SMCA-Union negotiations; it did not know 
that the SMCA and Herre Bros. had shared information in 
this manner. More importantly, Mr. Kelly operated under 
the belief, which is not disputed by Herre Bros., that the 
Union's negotiations with Herre Bros. were supposed to be 
separate and independent from those with the SMCA. See 
id. at 225A-26A. Because a union's acquiescence to 
withdrawal is predicated on the notion that the 
withdrawing employer will negotiate independently and 
without attempting to secure terms to its satisfaction by 
accessing multiemployer bargaining information, we 
conclude that the Union in this case could not have 
acquiesced to Herre Bros.' revocation regardless of when it 
learned of Herre Bros.' status in the association and Mr. 
Forlizzi's position as president. 
 
We hold that, while an employer may remain a member 
of a multiemployer association to obtain benefits other than 
multiemployer bargaining, by revoking bargaining rights the 
employer must forgo the advantages of multiemployer 
bargaining. Cf. Bonanno Linen, 454 U.S. at 420 (Stevens, 
J., concurring). An employer cannot both utilize the 
advantages of multiemployer bargaining and revoke 
bargaining rights so as to avoid being bound to a 
multiemployer agreement. We adopt the Fifth Circuit's and 
the Board's stated policy which prohibits using withdrawal 
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from multiemployer bargaining as a bargaining lever. See 
Marine Mach. Works, 635 F.2d at 524; Associated Shower 
Door, 205 N.L.R.B. at 682. 
 
Mr. Forlizzi's admission that he requested and used 
information from the SMCA to compare the negotiations, 
that such information was not sent to him in his capacity 
as president of the SMCA, and Ms. Eshenaur's confirmation 
of these statements show only that Herre Bros. did not 
abandon the advantages of group bargaining. Because we 
conclude that Mr. Forlizzi's conduct was inconsistent with 
Herre Bros.' stated intent to revoke its bargaining rights 
and therefore invalidated the revocation, and because the 
Union did not acquiesce to the nullification of the 
revocation, we hold that the district court did not err in 
concluding that Herre Bros. is bound to the 1995 
agreement between the Union and the members of the 
SMCA under S 13 of that agreement. 
 
IV 
 
The question remains whether the district court properly 
granted the Union specific performance of the 1995 
agreement. Herre Bros. argues that the district court 
should not have granted specific performance for two 
reasons: (1) the Union's request for specific performance 
was unspecified until after trial and therefore untimely; and 
(2) the equitable remedy was not necessary because the 
district court was capable of determining the legal measure 
of damages, as evidenced by its order filed August 27, 
1997. 
 
In its amended complaint, the Union requested money 
damages representing lost wages and fringe benefits, a 
declaratory judgment, and "[s]uch other relief as the Court 
deems just and reasonable." App., Vol. II at 284A. We have 
held that "Rule 8(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure does not require that the demand for judgment 
be pled with great specificity." Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 
v. Keystone Heating & Air Cond., 934 F.2d 35, 40 (3d Cir. 
1991). As a result, we believe that the request for relief in 
the amended complaint is broad enough to encompass a 
request for specific performance, especially in light of the 
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actual request made in a post-trial brief.13 For this reason 
and because a trial court is required to "grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in the 
party's pleadings," Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c), we cannot say that 
the Union's request for specific performance was untimely 
or otherwise improper. 
 
We now turn to the second argument. While this court 
has not explicitly stated its standard for reviewing decisions 
granting or denying specific performance, we have 
suggested that we use a discretionary standard. See Castle 
v. Cohen, 840 F.2d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that "a 
court of equity may, in its discretion, grant specific 
performance"); First Nat'l State Bank v. Commonwealth Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 610 F.2d 164, 174 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(holding that trial judge's decision to grant specific 
performance, which placed substantial hardship on one 
party, was not an abuse of discretion). Because the 
equitable remedy of specific performance is not a matter of 
absolute right but rests within the sound discretion of the 
court, we review the district court's decision to grant 
specific performance for an abuse of discretion. Accord 
Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 106 F.3d 
1388, 1403 (7th Cir. 1997) (reviewing grant of specific 
performance for an abuse of discretion); Walser v. Toyota 
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 43 F.3d 396, 403 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(same); Koch v. Koch, 903 F.2d 1333, 1335 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(same); Klein v. PepsiCo, Inc., 845 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 
1988) (same); Trans Union Credit Info. Co. v. Associated 
Credit Servs., Inc., 805 F.2d 188, 193 & n.6 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(same); Leasco Corp. v. Taussig, 473 F.2d 777, 786 (2d Cir. 
1972) (same). A court may grant specific performance if 
there is no adequate remedy at law. See Castle, 840 F.2d at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Although Herre Bros. did not provide the court with a copy of the 
Union's post-trial brief in the record, both parties agree that the 
Union's 
post-trial brief, which was filed after the conclusion of the November 
1996 bench trial on damages, see App., Vol. II at 271A; Attach. to 
Appellant's Br. (Order filed Nov. 20, 1996), contained a request for 
specific performance. Herre Bros. filed a responsive memorandum 
objecting to the request for specific performance. See App., Vol. II at 
278A. 
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178 (citing Portnoy v. Brown, 243 A.2d 444, 446 (Pa. 
1968)); Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 
F.2d 96, 103 (3d Cir. 1986). We exercise plenary review to 
determine whether there is an adequate remedy at law. See 
Kroblin, 805 F.2d at 103. 
 
In any suit seeking specific performance, a grant of 
equitable relief is available only as a substitute in "the 
absence of an adequate remedy at law." Dairy Queen, Inc. 
v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962). Generally, the legal 
remedy is inadequate in only two situations: 
 
       (1) where damages would be insufficient because the 
       subject matter of the contract is of such a special 
       nature that it resists translation into quantitative 
       terms--the damage remedy would not be a just and 
       reasonable substitute for or representative of that 
       subject-matter in the hands of the party who is entitled 
       to its benefit; or (2) where damages are impracticable 
       because it is impossible to arrive at a legal measure of 
       damages at all, or at least with any sufficient degree of 
       certainty. 
 
First Nat'l State Bank, 610 F.2d at 171 (quotation marks 
and citations omitted); see also Girard Bank v. John 
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 524 F. Supp. 884, 888 n.1, 895- 
96 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (applying First National State Bank 
reasoning to analysis of specific performance under 
Pennsylvania law and ordering specific performance), aff'd, 
688 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1982) (Table). 
 
We can see nothing unusually special about the nature of 
the 1995 agreement that would make damages insufficient 
if they were reduced to quantitative terms. See First Nat'l 
State Bank, 610 F.2d at 171. The record shows that after 
a trial on the damages in this case the district court 
calculated several different measures of damages. Itfirst 
determined that the Union was entitled to $12,577.00 for 
Herre Bros.' "failure to pay union members in accordance 
with the 1995 contract for work performed after May 31, 
1995." App., Vol. I at 19A. The court then held that lost 
wages are not a proper element of damages, see id. at 27A, 
and it calculated the amount recoverable for work 
performed by nonunion workers. For two periods of time, 
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from June 1, 1995, through May 31, 1996, and from June 
1, 1996, through September 27, 1996, the court calculated 
damages for "straight time" and overtime work performed 
by nonunion workers, for a total of $269,181.32. Id. at 28A. 
Third, the court awarded uncontested liquidated damages 
in the amount of $43,445.66. Finally, in response to the 
Union's request for an accounting of damages for work 
performed by nonunion workers after September 27, 1996, 
the court directed Herre Bros. to provide the Union with an 
accounting of hours worked by nonunion workers between 
September 27, 1996, and the date of the court's Order, 
August, 27, 1997. See id. at 12A, 31A. The court instructed 
the Union that it could file a supplemental brief on this 
issue and permitted Herre Bros. to file a reply brief.14 
 
It is not erroneous as a matter of law to award both 
damages and specific performance. See First Nat'l State 
Bank, 610 F.2d at 174 (stating that award of incidental 
damages in addition to specific performance award was not 
improper). Here, the district court calculated damages up to 
the time of its order and concluded that the best way to 
deal with damages from the date of its order to the end of 
the collective bargaining agreement (from August 27, 1997, 
to May 31, 1998) was to order specific performance of the 
agreement. As evidenced by the court's need to order an 
accounting and further briefing from the parties for 
damages from the date that discovery was concluded, 
September 27, 1996, to the date of its order, August 27, 
1997, it is reasonable to conclude that calculating damages 
for the period from August 27, 1997, to the end of the 1995 
agreement, May 31, 1998, would have been impracticable 
at best. Because a period of time remained in the 1995 
agreement at the time the district court filed its August 27, 
1997 Order and Memorandum, there was no way it could 
have calculated "with any sufficient degree of certainty" 
how many contracts Herre Bros. would have and how many 
employees it would require. Id. at 171. Thus, based on the 
uncertainty of Herre Bros.' future amount of work, we 
conclude that damages were impracticable and there was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. With respect to damages for work that was subcontracted by Herre 
Bros. after June 1, 1995, the court held that the Union had not met its 
burden of establishing this type of damages. 
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no adequate remedy at law for the period of time remaining 
in the 1995 agreement. On the basis of this conclusion, we 
hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
ordering specific performance. 
 
We AFFIRM the district court's order of specific 
performance. 
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